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U.S.
- MEXICO AGRICULTURE: A TRADE SUCCESS
STORY
Agricultural trade and investment
plays an important role in U.S.-Mexico
economic relations, even with the uneven
size of the two economies. In 1998,
agricultural exports from the United
States to Mexico totaled about $6
billion, while agricultural exports from
Mexico to the United States totaled
about $4.7 billion. For the United
States, this represented about 12
percent of agricultural exports while
for Mexico, it represented more than 60
percent of agricultural exports.
Agriculture
in Mexico and in the U.S.
Mexican agriculture is a much more
significant factor in the Mexican
economy than U.S. agriculture is in the
U.S. economy.
Agriculture contributes 8 percent to
Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP)
and employs about 22 percent of the
labor force (about 8 million workers).
For the United States, agriculture
comprises only 2 percent of GDP and
employs about 2.7 percent of the labor
force (a bit under 4 million workers).
However, the United States has
considerably more arable land than
Mexico. Only 12 percent (230 thousand
square kilometers) of Mexico is arable
while 19 percent (1,800 thousand square
kilometers) of U.S. land is arable.
Agricultural
Trade Trends
The 1990s has been a decade of
exceptional growth in U.S.-Mexico
agricultural trade. U.S. agricultural
exports to Mexico at the beginning of
this decade totaled $2.5 billion and
grew 12 percent annually to $3.6 billion
in 1993, the year before the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
was implemented. The 1995 peso crisis
and ensuing recession in Mexico caused a
23 percent downturn in these exports
that year. However, starting in 1996,
U.S. exports recovered exceptionally
well, leading to an average annual
compound rate of growth of almost 11
percent per year since NAFTA was
ratified. Mexico is now the
third-largest market for U.S.
agricultural exports, exceeded only by
Japan and Canada.
Mexican agricultural exports to the
United States have grown about 11.5
percent per year since NAFTA came into
force. Prior to NAFTA, Mexican exports
to the U.S. were stagnant at about $2.5
billion per year.
U.S. exports to Mexico have been lead
by grains, growing at almost 13 percent
per year, and oilseeds and their
products, with a growth rate of 12
percent per year. Mexican exports to the
U.S. have been led by vegetables,
growing at 11 percent per year; fruits
at 17 percent per year; and beverages,
at 28 percent per year.
Mexico’s
Internal Changes
Well before NAFTA was negotiated,
Mexico embarked on a serious effort to
modernize its agricultural sector.
Early in the 1990s, Mexico began
reducing artificial sanitary and
phytosanitary restrictions on imported
agricultural products and eliminated
import and export licenses.
In 1992, Article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution was amended to provide both
subsistence and private farmers with
legal certainty of land ownership.

In 1993, Mexico moved away from its
traditional approach to help the farm
community, namely, providing subsidies
for fertilizer, electricity, credit,
insurance, etc., and price controls on
products. It adopted in its place a
program called Procampo, which provides
direct payments to farmers who produced
maize, beans, wheat and other grains.
The payments on these products are based
on crop area in these products between
1990 and 1993. They are fixed in real
terms and will be paid for 15 years
whether the farmer continues in that
production or not.
All of these changes moved Mexico
away from the Ejidos system: land tenure
that arose out of land reform following
the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917). This
reform divided up large landholdings and
provided individuals with between 9 and
45 acres that could be worked
individually or collectively, but not
sold or rented. This system became
progressively less efficient over time.
In 1995, President Zedillo instituted
an Alliance for Agricultural Development
which grew out of a ministerial-level
task force to provide a diagnosis of the
agricultural sector and to develop a
plan to rescue the rural sector,
increase rural welfare, profitability
and competitiveness. This public-private
sector initiative aims to improve
productivity by increasing investment,
shifting production toward higher value
added products and developing
agribusiness opportunities. The details
of this program were conceived mostly by
producers and will be run both by
producers and by State Agricultural
Councils.
NAFTA
Chapter 7 of NAFTA lays out the rules
for agricultural trade between the three
North American partners. It contains
three separate bilateral arrangements
for U.S., Mexican and Canadian
agricultural trade.
NAFTA’s goal is the liberalization
of agricultural trade and the reduction,
elimination, and harmonization of
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
measures.
NAFTA eliminated most non-tariff
barriers and many tariff barriers
immediately and began a process to phase
out all tariffs over 10 or 15 years.
By setting up a trilateral
agricultural working group, the NAFTA
process works to avoid barriers created
by SPS measures, to harmonize
agricultural classification and to
develop grading and marketing standards.
It also encourages the elimination of
export subsidies and the use of domestic
support programs that are not
trade-distorting.
A number of the trade disputes
between the United States and Mexico
arise from SPS issues. An SPS is any
scientifically defensible measure taken
to protect human, plant or animal life
or health.
NAFTA prohibits the use of SPS
measures as disguised barriers to trade.
While nothing in NAFTA prevents
member countries from establishing
measures to protect consumers from
unsafe products or protect domestic
crops and livestock from foreign
diseases, countries are encouraged to
adopt international and regional
standards where appropriate.
State and local governments are
allowed to enact standards more
stringent than those adopted at the
national level, so long as these
standards are scientifically defensible.
For example, California has a number of
SPS measures more restrictive than
national standards.
Comparative
Advantage WITHIN North America
It is important to understand the
complementary nature of agricultural
production in the United States and
Mexico. The United States has a
comparative advantage in grain
production, animals and animal products,
and oilseeds.
A good
example is corn.
Corn shipments to Mexico averaged
about 700 metric tons (MT) during the
two years prior to NAFTA due to Mexico’s
artificially high domestic price for
corn.
Since the start of NAFTA, Mexico has
permitted the market to allocate corn
production. U.S. exports of corn have
soared to an average annual shipment of
4,000 MT.
Corn was one of the products most
sensitive in Mexico, and Mexico set a
15-year phase out of its Tariff Rate
Quota (TRQ). A TRQ establishes a
two-tier tariff rate: a low rate on
imports up to a certain quota level and
a much higher rate on imports above that
level. Mexico’s quota level for the
low tariff rate was set at 2,500 MT for
1994 and increases 3 percent a year. The
initial over-quota tariff of 215 percent
is cut 24 percent over the first six
years and will be eliminated after 2008.
In most of the first five years of NAFTA,
Mexico has been importing corn well
above the quota level. However, in order
to maintain relatively low corn prices
in its domestic market, Mexico has
chosen not to collect the higher duties.
Mexico has a
comparative advantage in vegetables,
fruits and beverages.
Mexico’s exports to the United
States of winter vegetables has grown
from about $1 billion in sales in 1993
to about $1.8 billion in 1998 under
NAFTA. This represents a 12.5 percent
increase per year in these sales.
Mexico’s exports of fruits and
fruit juices also have grown
extraordinarily fast, rising from $.3
billion in 1995 to $.7 billion in 1998,
an 18.5 percent annual increase.
Shifting agricultural production away
from grains and towards vegetables,
fruits and fresh flowers will continue.
Currently only 9 percent of cultivated
area in Mexico is used for the
production of fruits, vegetables and
fresh flowers, but this output accounts
for 34 percent of the value of Mexican
agriculture. Conversely, 67 percent of
the cultivated land is used for grains,
but this leads to only 36 percent output
by value.
Agricultural
Trade Disputes
In the context of almost $11 billion
in two-way agricultural trade between
the United States and Mexico, trade
disputes, while important, do not impact
the overall success of economic
integration in agriculture. The NAFTA
itself has processes, methods and
procedures to assist in the solution of
problems.
There are three types of disputes
that have occurred between the United
States and Mexico under NAFTA in
agriculture. First are the sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) disagreements.
Second are the accusations of “dumping,”
which means goods are sold at a lower
price than they are in the home country
or less than the cost of production. The
third area of dispute involves different
interpretations of the NAFTA agreement
itself.
Avocados
There have been two important products
where there has been major progress
toward a solution in a trade dispute:
avocados and tomatoes. The United States
prohibited the import of avocados from
Mexico for 83 years for SPS reasons.
Mexico made the case that the reason for
the SPS exclusions had been solved. The
U.S. Department of Agriculture issued a
final ruling in early 1997 to permit
U.S. imports of Mexican Haas avocados
from the state of Michoacan to 19
northeastern states and the District of
Columbia from November through February.
Mexico has requested that additional
northern states be added to the list.
Tomatoes
Tomato imports constitute about a
quarter of U.S. consumption and most of
these come from Mexico. The Mexican
tomato industry has made major
technological changes in recent years
and is becoming increasingly competitive
with U.S.-grown tomatoes because of high
quality and low cost. Florida growers
brought a dumping complaint against
Mexican tomato growers. This complaint
has been at least temporarily resolved
by an agreement with private sector
Mexican producers to voluntarily sell
their tomatoes above a minimum price.
Sugar
NAFTA calls for the complete
liberalization of trade in sugar between
the United States and Mexico by 2007. At
the time NAFTA was negotiated, there was
the clear view among U.S. industry and
the U.S. government that Mexico would
not be a major exporter of sugar. The
Mexican government had privatized the
sugar industry in 1989 and the industry
was struggling with a lack of capital in
the early 1990s.
The United States has a very
protected sugar market, with U.S.
domestic prices generally well above
world market prices. The high domestic
U.S. price is maintained by a strict
quota system for imports and to date has
been maintained with no government
outlays. As part of the NAFTA agreement,
Mexico has adopted U.S.-style sugar
protection. Thus domestic prices in
Mexico also are well above world prices.
In addition, the privatized Mexican
sugar industry has embarked on a
strategy of increasing productivity and
lowering production costs. Mexico is now
a net exporter of sugar.
The NAFTA dispute arises from
different interpretations of the
agreement for sugar under NAFTA. In
order to get the NAFTA agreement
approved by Congress, Mexico and the
United States developed a side letter to
limit the imports of Mexican sugar
before 2007. First, this side letter
permitted Mexico to export more than its
historic small quantity of sugar only if
it became a net exporter of sugar. The
side letter made this more difficult by
including High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS)
only on the consumption side. In fact,
Mexico became a net exporter of sugar in
1997 and has shipped its limit of 25,000
MT, which will continue until October
2000. At that time the U.S. version of
the side letter will limit Mexican sugar
exports to 250,000 MT until 2007. Mexico
believes that all limits are to be
removed in October 2000. During the
process of this negotiation there were a
number of drafts of side letters, and
today there is no agreement as to which
was the final version.
This sugar issue also is mixed up
with Mexico’s concern with the rapidly
increasing imports from the United
States of HFCS. HFCS now represents
about 20 percent of the sweetener market
in Mexico. While most HFCS is imported
from the United States, new production
facilities are being developed in Mexico
in partnership with U.S. industry.
Mexican duties on HFCS are falling
due to NAFTA but were temporarily
increased due to the dispute over corn
broom imports to the U.S. On top of
this, Mexico issued a finding in 1997
that U.S. firms were dumping HFCS and
retaliated with a significant dumping
duty. This duty has had its desired
effect of reducing U.S. exports of HFCS
to Mexico.
Cattle and
Hogs
Hog prices in the United States in 1998
were exceptionally low due in part to
the economic crisis in Asia and a strike
at a processing plant in Canada. In June
1998, the Mexican Pork Producers Council
filed an antidumping petition against
the U.S. swine industry. In February the
Mexican government made a preliminary
determination that U.S. sales of live
hogs were being made below cost and this
had a potential damaging impact on
Mexican production. The Mexican
government has established a floor price
for hog imports into Mexico at a level
designed to protect its domestic
production.
Cattle trade between the United
States and Mexico has been complicated
since the start of NAFTA. First, with
NAFTA, Mexico reduced its 15 percent
duty on live cattle to zero. Due to the
economic recession and draught in 1995
and 1996, Mexico exported much of its
stock of cattle to the United States for
slaughter. For the past two years, about
half of the cattle exported from the
United States to Mexico has been for
breeding purposes to increase its herds.
Meanwhile, since grain prices have been
lower in the United States, Mexico has
continued to export cattle to the U.S.
for fattening before slaughter (feeder
cattle). In 1994 the Mexican cattle
industry filed an anti-dumping complaint
against the U.S. cattle industry. While
the Mexican government found some
evidence of price discrimination, it did
not find the threat of injury and the
case was dropped. This case was renewed
in 1998. Meanwhile, the U.S. industry in
1998 initiated an anti-dumping case
against the Mexican industry. In January
this case was dismissed as the U.S.
International Trade Commission found no
threat of injury to the U.S. industry
from Mexico. Meanwhile, the two major
industry groups in the U.S. and Mexico
have been working together to resolve
differences.
Investment
in Agriculture
A number of U.S. agribusiness firms
have significant investments in Mexico.
These include Campbell Soup, General
Mills, Ralston Purina, PepsiCo, CPC
International, Kraft Foods, Coca-Cola
and Pilgrim’s Pride. For example,
Pilgram’s Pride, the fourth-largest
chicken producer in the U.S., entered
Mexico in 1988 with an initial
investment of $25 million. From its
initial 480 thousand kilos of locally
produced birds per week of production,
it is now the second-largest chicken
producer in Mexico with 2.7 million
kilos of chicken and an investment of
about $180 million.
Sales of these affiliated companies
grew rapidly before NAFTA following the
opening of Mexican industry to foreign
investment, from $1.6 billion in 1987 to
about $6 billion at the start of NAFTA
in 1994.
These sales stagnated at that level
for the first few years due to the peso
crisis. Over the past two years, these
sales have again been growing
significantly. It is interesting to note
that based on the analysis of the U.S.
government, only about 3 percent of the
product of these affiliates of U.S.
companies is exported back to the U.S.
And Mexican firms also are investing
in Mexican agriculture. For example,
Grupo Maseca is the holding company
of Gruma Corp., headquartered in
Monterrey, N.L., with subsidiaries
located in Los Angeles and Irving,
Texas. Gruma has modernized traditional
corn flour and tortilla production and
has become a world leader in this
business through its expansion of
operations throughout Mexico and into
the United States and Central America.
Gruma is now the largest corn flour
producer in the United States.
Pulsar International, also
headquartered in Monterrey, has a number
of high-technology agribusiness
companies as part of its operations.
Savia (formerly Empresas la Moderna) is
a multinational agrobiotechnology
company active in 123 countries on five
continents. Pulsar has invested more
than $4 million in the International
Agricultural Research and Training
Center, located in Chiapas to conduct
research on more efficient agricultural
production methods, including the use of
beneficial insects as an alternative to
traditional pesticides.
Agriculture
and the Environment
NAFTA specifically prohibits the
relaxing of environmental, health or
safety measures as a way to attract
investment. The side agreement
specifically required each NAFTA country
to effectively enforce their own
environmental laws. Keeping track of
environmental laws in Mexico at the
federal, state and local levels will be
facilitated by the Access-Mexico program
of the U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce.
This program is developing an on-line
database with all of the Mexican
environmental laws and regulations in
Spanish with English translation.
Food Safety
In October 1998, the U.S. president
established the President’s Council on
Food Safety. This Council is tasked with
developing a comprehensive strategic
plan for federal food safety activities,
taking into consideration the 1998
report of the National Academy of
Science (NAS) which analyzed the current
food safety system and made
recommendations to improve that system.
The NAS report noted that an effective
and efficient food safety system must be
based on science and that a
reorganization of federal food safety
efforts is required. The NAS report
further noted that the plan should
address the additional and distinctive
efforts required to ensure the safety of
imported foods.
In April 1998 the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) issued draft
guidelines on steps to minimize
microbial food safety hazards for fresh
fruits and vegetables and set June 1999
as the deadline for comments. The
Mexican Agriculture Department (SAGAR)
is working in coordination with FDA and
USDA in many areas of food safety,
including the development of 15 sanitary
protocols with the United States. SAGAR
is providing information and technical
assistance to 64 Mexican farm
organizations and has established 80
specific animal and plant health
standards and 64 quality standards as
part of its certification system for
animal and plant health, quality
assurance and food safety.
Conclusion
The dramatic increase in agricultural
trade between the United States and
Mexico is a result of liberalizing trade
on both sides of the border and the
reality that each country has a
comparative advantage in a wide variety
of products. U.S. agribusiness firms are
well established in Mexico and there are
many additional areas for further
investment. The governments of Mexico
and the United States are working well
together to solve a few specific
problems in agricultural trade and the
Chamber urges this effort be continued
and the existing disputes be resolved.
The increased emphasis of the U.S.
government on food safety, and its work
with Mexican agricultural officials,
should assure U.S. and Mexican consumers
that all food is safe, including
imported food.
-- March
1999
The preceding paper is part of the
United State-Mexico Chamber of
Commerce's NAFTA Forum series, which
considers general trade issues and
sector-specific concerns between the two
nations. The information contained
herein is for informational and
educational purposes only.
CONTACT
INFORMATION:
Albert C. Zapanta, President
John Harrington, Senior Economist and
author of NAFTA Forum series
Jeff Sparshott, Director of
Communications
United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 270
Washington, DC 20004-3021
Tel: 202-371-8680 Fax: 202-371-8686 |